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Hundreds of papers investigate corporate financial decisions and the factors that influence
capital structure. Much theoretical work characterizes the choice between debt and equity in
a trade-off context in which firms choose their optimal debt ratio by balancing the benefits
and costs. Traditionally, tax savings that occur because interest is deductible have been
modeled as a primary benefit of debt (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). Other benefits include
committing managers to operate efficiently (Jensen, 1986) and engaging lenders to monitor
the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The costs of debt include financial distress (Scott,
1976), personal taxes (Miller, 1977), debt overhang (Myers, 1977), and agency conflicts
between managers and investors or among different groups of investors. For the most part,
these theoretical predictions have been tested using reduced form regressions that attempt to
explain variation in capital structure policies based on estimated slope coefficients for factors
such as firm size, tax status, asset tangibility, profitability, and growth options (Rajan and
Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998).
In this paper, we empirically estimate the marginal cost curve for corporate debt using
an approach analogous to textbook supply/demand identification (Working, 1927; Hayashi,
2000). In our main analysis, we first simulate tax benefit functions using the approach of
Graham (2000). We observe a firm’s actual debt choice in a given year, which is represented
by a single point on its tax benefit function, and assume for our estimation sample that
this point represents the equilibrium intersection of the marginal cost and benefit of debt
functions. As the benefit functions shift, the variation in the intersection points allows us to
empirically map out the location of the cost of debt function. That is, we estimate what the
(perceived) marginal cost of debt must be to rationalize the typical firm’s capital structure
choices.
These estimated marginal cost curves should capture ex ante costs that managers trade
off against tax benefits as they choose their optimal capital structure. These factors include
costs of financial distress and agency costs, among others.1 Note that we do not distinguish
1As described in more detail below, because we start with marginal tax benefit functions, the estimated
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actual costs from costs as they are perceived or responded to by managers. These perceived
costs could potentially differ from actual costs due to biases in the managerial decision-
making process. For example, a firm with ample potential tax benefits that uses very little
debt may actually face very high costs of debt, or the company may use little debt due to
managerial bias. Either way, the low debt choice would be captured as a high cost of debt
in our estimation procedure.
To interpret the actual debt choice as representing the intersection of marginal cost and
benefit curves, we focus on firms that appear able to make unconstrained (optimal) choices.
In our main analysis we therefore set aside financially distressed companies (based on a
measure of Altman’s Z-score). We also set aside firms that may be financially constrained
(e.g., zero debt firms) by only retaining firm-year observations in which a material rebalancing
of capital structure occurs. We assume that the remaining firms make (close to) optimal debt
choices, and we use these choices to back out what the (actual or perceived) costs of debt
must be to justify observed debt ratios. We note that our results are robust to including these
apparently distressed or constrained firms in the sample, and also to different definitions of
financial constraint. Related to this issue, our analysis is robust to the presence of fixed
adjustment costs. It has been argued (e.g., Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner, 1989; Leary
and Roberts, 2005; and Strebulaev, 2007) that fixed adjustment costs prevent firms from
responding instantaneously to changing conditions, leading to infrequent capital structure
adjustments. By estimating our model on only those firm-year observations in which a
substantial rebalancing of capital structure occurs, we mitigate the effect of fixed adjustment
costs.
We use two different identification strategies which lead to qualitatively and
quantitatively similar marginal cost of debt functions. Both of these strategies rely on
variation in marginal tax benefits. In the first approach, we simulate a marginal tax benefit
cost of debt functions also capture the non-tax benefits of debt. These non-tax benefits are effectively
negative costs.
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function for each firm-year observation. This allows us to use a panel of time series and cross-
sectional benefit variation to identify the cost curve. For this approach to work, the cost curve
must remain fixed as the benefit function varies. To hold the cost function fixed, we include
in the specification control variables that have been used in the prior literature to capture
costs. To the extent that these control variables hold the cost environment constant, we can
use the remaining variation in marginal benefits to estimate the cost curve. One advantage
of this method is that it can be used in any sample period, including periods when there
are no tax regime changes. In particular, we show that our estimates are robust across
different time subsamples and when including time dummies. Another advantage is that the
inclusion of the control variables allows the cost curve to shift location conditional on firm
characteristics. However, this identification method relies importantly on the assumption
that the control variables are comprehensive and hold the cost environment constant. The
second identification strategy deemphasizes cross-sectional variation, and the need to control
for the cost environment, by relying only on time series variation in the benefit curves due
to the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA).
Based on these identification approaches, the ex ante marginal cost of debt curves that
we estimate are positively sloped (i.e., cost increases with interest expense), as expected.
The positive slope is indicative of debt costs that increase directly with the amount of debt
used, such as expected costs of financial distress. The location of the cost functions vary (i.e.,
shift) with firm characteristics such as asset collateral, size, book-to-market, asset tangibility,
cash flows, and dividend-paying status. That is, the location of the cost function varies with
firm-specific features of the cost of debt. For example, the cost function shifts downward as
a firm’s collateral increases. In general, our approach produces an ex ante estimate of the
net cost of debt function for a wide variety of firms. This expands upon previous research,
much of which provides point estimates for the ex post cost of debt for small subsets of firms.
We also produce easy-to-implement algorithms that allow researchers and practitioners to
explicitly specify firm-specific debt cost functions.
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As described above, we estimate the cost functions on a subsample of firms that
appear not to be financially constrained or distressed. We subsequently use the estimated
coefficients to compute a cost of debt curve for any firm, including those that are distressed
or constrained. Armed with firm-specific simulated marginal tax benefit functions and
estimated marginal cost of debt functions for thousands of companies, we can infer optimal
capital structure for any given firm at the intersection of the benefit and cost curves, as
illustrated in Figure 1. We also integrate the area between the curves to estimate the net
benefits of debt financing, and similarly estimate the cost of deviating from the optimum.
For the full sample of firms, the equilibrium gross benefits of debt are 10.4% of book value,
the costs are 6.9%, and the net benefits are 3.5%.2 In this full sample, among firms that
we label as financially constrained or distressed, our numbers imply that deadweight losses
from using less debt than the implied optimum (i.e., actual debt usage is less than the debt
ratio occurring at the intersection of marginal cost and benefit) average 1.4% of book value.
In contrast, deadweight losses from superoptimal debt choices average 3.8%. Thus, in our
sample, the cost of being overlevered appears to be more severe than being underlevered.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
Traditional debt cost studies examine small samples and focus on a subset of the ex post
costs of debt. Warner (1977), for example, studies 11 bankrupt railroad companies, and
estimates that ex post direct bankruptcy costs are about 5.3% of firm value. Weiss (1990)
similarly estimates that direct bankruptcy costs are only 3.1% of firm value in a sample of 37
companies. Bris, Welch and Zhu (2006) estimate ex post legal costs for 212 firms filing for
bankruptcy in New York and Arizona. In their sample, direct Chapter 11 expenses average
about 9.5% of asset value. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) estimate that for a sample of 31
2Note that we measure gross tax benefits with the benefit function. Therefore, the cost function measures
the costs of debt net of any non-tax benefits (which would show up as negative costs in the cost function).
That is, what we refer to as the costs of debt are actually the all-in costs of debt minus any non-tax benefits
of debt. This consideration does not affect the estimation or interpretation of the net benefits of debt. See
footnote 25.
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highly levered firms, when distress occurs the cost of financial distress is no more than 10%
to 20% of firm value. Miller (1977) and others note that once one considers the relatively low
probability that financial distress will occur, the ex ante costs of debt appear to be small.
One conclusion from these traditional papers is that there must be other reasonably large
costs of debt to justify the debt choices that firms make. While these traditional papers are
instructive, our analysis contributes by directly estimating ex ante all-in costs of debt, and
by examining a broad cross-section of firms rather than a small ex post sample.
Recent research argues that thorough consideration leads to costs of debt that roughly
equal the marginal (tax) benefits of debt in equilibrium.3 For example, in Green and
Hollifield’s (2003) model, bankruptcy costs equal to 3% of firm value, combined with a
personal tax disadvantage to interest income, are sufficient to justify an interior optimal
debt ratio. Berk, Stanton and Zechner (2010) conclude that higher wages due to increased
labor risk associated with greater corporate leverage should be modeled as a cost of debt.
Carlson and Lazrak (2006) argue that increased firm risk due to asset substitution produces
costs sufficient to offset the tax benefits of debt. Our approach captures these and other costs
of debt that drive observed (equilibrium) corporate debt choices. The resulting cost curve is
a positive function of the level of debt and its location is conditional on firm characteristics
related to the theorized factors just discussed, among others.
Our approach is related to three other recent papers. Almeida and Philippon (2007)
derive risk-neutral probabilities of default that capture the fact that the marginal utility of
money is high in distress states. (Chen (2008) and Bhamra, Kuhn and Strebulaev (2008)
make a similar point.) Using these probabilities, they estimate that the expected cost of
distress is approximately equal to the tax benefits of debt estimated in Graham (2000),
suggesting that on average observed capital structure is consistent with optimal choices.
More specifically, the authors provide a point estimate of the cost of default that is about
4% of firm value for investment grade firms and about 9% for speculative debt. We estimate
3In addition, see Parrino and Weisbach (1999).
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that the all-in cost of debt is about 6% (17%) of firm value for investment (speculative)
grade firms. Therefore, our estimates are in the same ballpark but larger than Almeida and
Philippon’s, which is logical because their estimates reflect default costs while ours include
default as well as other costs of debt (such as agency costs). Overall, our analysis shows that
default costs, as estimated by Almeida and Philippon (2007), amount to approximately half
of the total costs of debt, leaving about half of the costs to be explained by other factors
and theories.4
Korteweg (2009) estimates the net benefits to leverage from a data set of about 30,000
firm-months between 1994 and 2004. By generalizing the Modigliani-Miller beta levering
and firm valuation formulas, he estimates how the net benefits of debt must vary with
leverage and other covariates to explain the observed variation in stock and bond betas
and valuations. For identification he assumes within-industry homogeneity with respect to
asset betas, but he allows the net benefit function to vary on a firm-by-firm basis, based on
individual firm characteristics. Even with this different approach, he estimates median net
benefits to leverage of about 4% relative to total firm value, close to our results.
Finally, Morellec, Nikolov and Schu¨rhoff (2008) argue that, from a manager’s point of
view, debt is constraining to the extent that it can justify observed capital structure levels.
As mentioned before, our framework captures costs as they are perceived or responded to
by managers to the extent they are reflected in debt choice.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we explain the main intuition
and econometric issues underlying our instrumental variables approach and provide details
for our identification strategies. In Section II, we describe the data and our sample selection
process. In Section III, we present and discuss our results, and in Section IV we compute
firm-specific marginal cost of debt functions and discuss several case studies. In Section V,
we calculate the benefits and costs of debt and analyze the costs of being underlevered or
4We also benchmark the reasonableness of our numbers by showing that our estimated cost of debt for
firms in the 90th to 99th percentile range are very similar to the costs estimated by Andrade and Kaplan
(1998) for highly levered firms.
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overlevered. Section VI discusses several robustness checks. Finally, Section VII concludes.
I Estimating Marginal Cost Curves
The main objective of this paper is to estimate the marginal cost curve of debt, given in
equation (1). In particular, we estimate a linear parametrization in which the marginal cost
of debt for firm i ∈ 1, ..., N at time t ∈ 1, ..., T is linear in the amount of leverage, xi,t, and
a set of control variables, Ci,t:
MCi,t = a + bxi,t +
∑
c∈C
θcci,t + ξi,t. (1)
In this parametrization, a denotes the intercept of the marginal cost curve of debt and b
denotes the slope.5 Each θc is a coefficient for the firm specific control variables in C. The
variable ξi,t is an orthogonal shock.
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In Section I.A, we present the general methodology and equations we use to estimate the
marginal cost of debt. Section I.B details two separate identification strategies. Section I.C
compares and contrasts the two strategies.
I.A General Method
We use exogenous variation of the marginal benefit curve of debt to identify the marginal
cost curve of debt. To obtain a firm-year panel of benefit curves, we simulate the tax savings
benefit for each dollar of incremental interest deduction using the method of Graham (2000).
More generally, let MBi,t denote the marginal benefit curve of debt of firm i at time t as a
5Note that linearity of the marginal cost of debt implies that the total cost of debt is a quadratic function
of interest (xi,t). Further, a positive slope on xi,t in the marginal cost function implies that the total cost
curve is convex.
6We explore a generalization of equation (1) in which we include interaction terms between leverage and
each of the control variables. In this generalization both the slope and the intercept of the marginal cost
curve depend on the control variables. We find that this generalization adds little to the fit of the model,
nor does it change any of our main conclusions. The results are available upon request.
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function of the amount of leverage and an orthogonal shock ηi,t:
MBi,t = fi,t(xi,t) + ηi,t. (2)
The shock ηi,t represents a shift of the marginal benefit curve.
We assume that financially unconstrained, non-distressed firms choose their equilibrium
debt level optimally. Therefore, the observed level of debt of firm i in year t is the value
of leverage, x∗i,t, where the marginal benefit curve and the marginal cost curve intersect.
Henceforth, for unconstrained, non-distressed firms, we refer to this observed level of debt as
the “equilibrium amount of interest” or the “equilibrium level of debt,” denoted by x∗i,t. We
refer to the corresponding “equilibrium marginal benefit/cost of debt” as y∗i,t. In equilibrium,
at xi,t = x
∗
i,t, it holds that:
y∗i,t = MCi,t
(
x∗i,t
)
= MBi,t
(
x∗i,t
)
. (3)
To estimate the marginal cost curve of debt, one can not simply perform an OLS
regression of y∗i,t on x
∗
i,t and the controls, as in equation (1). Since leverage and marginal
costs/benefits are determined jointly, there is an endogeneity problem. If we use OLS,
this endogeneity problem can lead to biased estimates.7 Based on equilibrium (x∗i,t, y
∗
i,t)
choices, OLS is unable to distinguish whether variation in these choices is due to shifts in the
marginal cost or benefit curves, and hence is unable to identify either curve unambiguously.
Furthermore, shifts of the marginal benefit curve (ηi,t) are potentially correlated with shifts
of the marginal cost curve (ξi,t). By using instrumental variables that proxy for benefit shifts
and that are uncorrelated with cost shifts, we can identify the cost curve.8
Suppose that we have an instrument z. As described above, this instrument needs to
7The classic illustration of biases created by endogenous regressors is Working (1927), who explores this
problem in the context of supply and demand curves. See also Hayashi (2000).
8In unreported analysis, we use OLS (without instruments) to directly estimate equation (1). The
estimated slopes are negative, small, and insignificant, implying that the OLS estimates result in a line
that lies somewhere between the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves.
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satisfy two criteria. It needs to be correlated with shifts of the marginal benefit curve, and
it needs to be uncorrelated with shifts of the marginal cost curve:
corr (z, η) 6= 0 (4)
corr (z, ξ) = 0. (5)
Identification thus requires exogenous variation in the marginal benefit curve; that is, the
marginal benefit curve of debt must shift while the marginal cost curve remains constant.
The exogenous benefit variation may result from time series shifts of the marginal benefit
curve of firm i, e.g., tax regime shifts, or, alternatively, from cross-sectional variation in the
location of the marginal benefit curve of debt at some time t. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
With an instrument, z, that satisfies the two conditions above, one can use two stage
least squares (2SLS) to estimate the marginal cost curve depicted in equation (1). The first
stage regression consists of regressing x∗ on z and control variables, C, and obtaining fitted
values, xˆ. In the second stage regression, y∗ is regressed on the fitted value of the first stage,
xˆ, and control variables, C. The standard errors from the second stage of a 2SLS regression
do not reflect the uncertainty of the first stage estimation and should therefore not be used to
compute the t-statistics of estimated coefficients. Instead, we report GMM standard errors.
These standard errors are double clustered by both firm and year as in Thompson (2009)
and Petersen (2009). The moments corresponding to the estimation procedure are given by:
ga(a, b, {θc}) =
1
NT
∑
i
∑
t
(
yi,t − a− bxi,t −
∑
c∈C
θcci,t
)
, (6)
gz(a, b, {θc}) =
1
NT
∑
i
∑
t
(
yi,t − a− bxi,t −
∑
c∈C
θcci,t
)
zi,t, (7)
gc(a, b, {θc}) =
1
NT
∑
i
∑
t
(
yi,t − a− bxi,t −
∑
c∈C
θcci,t
)
ci,t, for c ∈ C. (8)
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Apart from these standard errors, we present our results in terms of 2SLS to facilitate
exposition. See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the 2SLS procedure as well as the
first stage regression results. One novel result from the first stage is that we document
firm-specific time series tax effects.9
I.B Identification Strategies
In this section, we detail two separate identification approaches that we use to identify the
marginal cost curve of debt. These approaches can broadly be characterized as follows: (i)
Panel Approach, (ii) 1986 Tax Reform Act. Both identification strategies use variation in
marginal tax benefits of debt to identify the cost curve. The set of control variables C is
the same for each strategy. The identifying instrument, z, that we use in each identification
strategy is given by:
(i) the area under the marginal benefit curve: AREA. (See Section I.B.1.)
(ii) the implementation of the 1986 Tax Reform Act: TRA86. (See Section I.B.2.)
I.B.1 Identification Strategy (i): Panel Approach
Our panel of simulated marginal benefit curves exhibits substantial variation both in the
time series and in the cross-section. The time series variation is mainly due to tax regime
changes, such as the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986. The cross-sectional variation in benefit
curves is related to (but not limited to) the occurrence of taxable losses and the ability to
carry those losses backwards or forward. We use this variation of the marginal benefit curves
to identify the marginal cost curve of debt.
As noted above, we have the advantage of observing a simulated version of the whole
marginal benefit curve of debt. This allows us to observe the variation in (or shifts of) these
benefit curves. To measure these shifts, we first compute for each firm in each year the total
9To our knowledge, this is the most direct time-series tax evidence in the literature. See Graham (2003).
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potential tax benefit of debt, AREAi,t, which is equal to the area under the marginal tax
benefit curve:
AREAi,t =
∞∫
0
fi,t (xi,t) dxi,t. (9)
Since the area under the curve measures the total potential tax benefits, AREA provides
a natural description of the location of the marginal benefit curve and accommodates non-
linearities in benefits. If the marginal benefit curve shifts upward (downward), then the
area under the curve increases (decreases) in tandem. Henceforth, we interpret variation
in this area measure as variation (shifts) of the marginal benefit curve.10 That is, for this
specification, z ≡ {AREA}.
As conveyed in equations (4) and (5), to obtain unbiased cost estimates we should only
use variation of the marginal benefit curve that is uncorrelated with variation in the marginal
cost curve. To accomplish this, we include in the specification a set of control variables C
that are theorized to be correlated with the location of the debt cost curve: a measure
of collateralizable assets (COL), the log of total assets (LTA), the book-to-market ratio
(BTM), a measure of intangible assets (INTANG), cash flow (CF ), and whether the firm
pays dividends (DDIV ). These variables represent the standard measures of debt costs
extensively used in the literature (Frank and Goyal, 2009).11 In summary, C denotes the set
of cost control variables that drive the location of the MC curve:
C ≡ {COL,LTA,BTM, INTANG,CF,DDIV }. (10)
Assuming that these control variables adequately hold the cost environment constant, the
remaining variation of the marginal benefit curves can be used to identify the cost curve.
10We explore alternative definitions that capture shifts of the marginal benefit curve, such as partitions of
the area measure, or including as a second instrument the location of the kink in the marginal benefit curve.
We repeat the analysis and all results hold. For ease of exposition, we focus on the area measure.
11These variables are defined in Section II and in Appendix B.
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We estimate this specification both with and without year dummies in both stages of the
regression. Including year dummies ensures that the identification of the slope of the cost
curve is driven by the cross-sectional variation of the marginal benefit curves and not by
time series variation. Reassuringly, we estimate similar cost curves in both cases.
I.B.2 Identification Strategy (ii): 1986 Tax Reform Act
Identification strategy (ii) uses the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 to identify the marginal
cost of debt curve. Under the 1986 TRA, corporate tax rates were reduced by 12 percentage
points for most firms. Furthermore, the 1986 TRA was phased-in in a manner that
differentially moves firms with different fiscal year-ends into the new, lower tax regime.
For example, firms with fiscal year-ends in June 1987 had all 12 months of income subject to
tax rates at the old 46% tax rate that year (see Maydew (1997)). Income for upper bracket
July 1987 fiscal year-end firms was subject to a blended tax rate that was 1
12
of the new 34%
statutory tax rate and 11
12
of the old 46% tax rate. Firms with a fiscal year end in August were
exposed to 2
12
of the new tax rate and 10
12
of the previous tax rate for each income bracket,
and so on. Firms with December fiscal year ends faced half of the old tax regime and half of
the new tax regime (i.e., an upper bracket maximum tax rate of 1
2
(0.46)+1
2
(0.34)=0.40). By
June 1988, all firms had switched over to the new regime that had a maximum 34% tax rate.
This phase-in offers the identification advantage of the tax rate change affecting otherwise
similar firms at slightly different points in time.
Let FY Ri,t denote the month of firm i’s fiscal year end in year t and let TRA86i,t denote
the variable that captures the phase-in of the new tax regime. TRA86i,t takes the value 0
in and before 1986 and takes the value 1 in and after 1989. For 1987 and 1988, the phase-in
12
variable is defined as:
TRA86i,t =


0, if FY Ri,t ≤ 6 and t = 1987, or t < 1987
(FY Ri,t − 6)/12 if FY Ri,t > 6 and t = 1987
(FY Ri,t + 6)/12 if FY Ri,t ≤ 6 and t = 1988
1, if FY Ri,t > 6 and t = 1988, or t > 1988.
(11)
In our second identification strategy, we use TRA86i,t as our identifying instrument. This
instrument allows identification from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to come from two sources:
1) a general before and after time-series effect captured by the 0 before 1987 and 1 after
1988, and 2) an additional effect captured by the 1/12, 2/12, etc. phasing-in in 1987 and
1988 that affects different firms differently depending on their fiscal year-ends. In unreported
analysis, we document that identification is possible based on either 1) or 2) above; however,
we combine the two in the TRA86i,t variable used in specification (ii).
I.C Comparing the Two Identification Strategies
Each of the identification strategies has advantages and disadvantages. Identification
strategy (i) uses all of the variation in the marginal benefit curves available in the data
panel. This includes both time series and cross sectional variation. Recall that a unique
advantage of our data set is that we “observe” the whole simulated marginal benefit curve
of debt, and not just the equilibrium points where the marginal cost and marginal benefit
curves intersect.12 In other words we observe a simulated proxy for shocks to the marginal
benefit curve ηi,t, which we argue allows us to create an instrument, AREAi,t, that is highly
correlated with these marginal benefit shifts, as required by equation (4). In identification
method (ii), this advantage of knowing the whole benefit function is not exploited. Moreover,
identification strategy (i) can be used in periods in which there are no corporate tax regime
12In many cases, including the Working (1927) example, one only observes equilibrium points. In Working
(1927) these equilibrium points are equilibrium prices and quantities. We have the advantage of “observing”
one of the two curves. In the Working (1927) analogy this would imply observing the whole demand curve.
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shifts.
The downside of identification strategy (i) is that, in order for it to produce valid
estimates, the potential correlation between marginal benefit shifts and marginal cost shifts
needs to be captured fully by the cost control variables so as to fulfill the criteria in equation
(5). As such, omitted variables might lead to biased cost curve estimates. Specification
(ii) arguably relies less on this assumption, although we include cost control variables in
both identification strategies. However, the associated cost of specification (ii) is that the
information used for identification is more limited than the information used in specification
(i). In addition to the variation of specification (ii), specification (i) also includes variation
due to other tax regime changes as well as cross-sectional variation. Due to this trade-
off between information and the need to control for the cost environment, we present the
estimation results of both strategies. Reassuringly, we find similar results for both strategies.
II Data and Summary Statistics
II.A Marginal Tax Benefit Curves
Our marginal benefit curves are derived as in Graham (2000). Each point on a benefit
function measures the present value tax benefit of a dollar of interest deduction. To illustrate,
ignore for this paragraph dynamic features of the tax code such as tax loss carryforwards
and carrybacks and other complexities. The first point on the tax benefit function measures
the tax savings associated with deducting the first dollar of interest. Additional points on
the function measure the tax savings from deducting a second dollar of interest, a third
dollar, and so on. Based on the current statutory federal tax schedule, each of these initial
interest deductions would be worth $0.35 for a profitable firm, where 0.35 is the corporate
marginal income tax rate. At some point, as incremental interest deductions are added,
all taxable income would be shielded by interest deductions, and incremental deductions
would be worthless. Therefore, ignoring the complexities of the tax code, a static tax benefit
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function would be a step function that has an initial value of 0.35 and eventually drops to
0.0.
The dynamic and complex features of the tax code have a tendency to stretch out and
smooth the benefit function. First, consider dynamic features such as tax loss carryforwards.
At the point at which all current taxable income is shielded by current interest deductions,
an extra dollar of interest leads to a loss today, which is carried forward to shield profits in
future years. For example, if that extra dollar of interest today effectively shields income
next year, it will save the firm $0.35 one year from today. In this situation, the present
value tax savings from an incremental dollar of interest today is worth the present value
of $0.35 today, or about $0.33. Once carryforwards are considered, therefore, rather than
stepping straight down to zero at the point of surplus current-period interest deductions, the
benefit function slopes downward, reaching zero gradually. Other features of the tax code
that we consider, such as tax loss carrybacks, the alternative minimum tax, and investment
tax credits also smooth the tax benefit function (see Graham and Smith (1999) for details).
Second, consider an uncertain world in which the probability of profitability is between
zero and one. Say, for example, that there is a 50-50 chance that a firm will be profitable.
In this case, even with a simple, static tax code, the expected tax benefit is $0.175 for one
dollar of interest deduction if profits are taxed at 35%. Therefore, we simulate tax benefit
functions so that our measure of the tax benefit of interest deductions at any given point is
conditional on the probability that the firm will be taxable today and in the future.
More specifically, we calculate one point on a tax benefit function for one firm in one year
as follows. (Recall that each point on the function represents the expected corporate marginal
tax rate (MTR) for that level of taxable income net of interest deduction.) The first step for a
given firm-year involves calculating the historic mean and variance of the change in taxable
income for each firm. Using this historical information, the second step forecasts future
income many years into the future to allow for full effects of the tax carryforward feature of
the tax code (e.g., 2006 tax law specified that tax losses could be carried forward 20 years
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into the future and back two years, so we forecast 22 years into the future when simulating
the 2006 benefit curves). These forecasts are generated with random draws from a normal
distribution, with mean and variance equal to that gathered in the first step; therefore, many
different forecasts of the future can be generated for each firm.13 In particular, we produce
50 forecasts of the future for each firm in each year.
The third step calculates the present value tax liability along each of the 50 income paths
generated in the second step, accounting for the tax-loss carryback, carryforward, and other
dynamic features of the tax code. The fourth step adds $10,000 (the smallest increment
observable in Compustat data) to current year income and recalculates the present value
tax liability along each path. The incremental tax liability calculated in the fourth step,
minus that calculated in the third step, is the present value tax liability from earning extra
income today; in other words, the economic MTR. A separate marginal tax rate is calculated
along each of the forecasted income paths to capture the different tax situations a firm might
experience in different future scenarios. The idea is to mimic the different planning scenarios
that a manager might consider. The final step averages across the MTRs from the 50 different
scenarios to calculate the expected economic marginal tax rate for a given firm-year.
These five steps produce the expected marginal tax rate for a single firm-year, for a given
level of interest deduction. To calculate the entire benefit function (for a given firm in a
given year), we replicate steps two through five for 17 different levels of interest deductions.
Expressed as a proportion of the actual interest that a firm deducted in a given firm-year,
these 17 levels are 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%, 120%, 160%, 200%, 300%, 400%, ...,
1000%. To clarify, 100% represents the actual level of deductions taken, so this point on the
benefit function represents that firm’s actual marginal tax rate in a given year, considering
the present value effects of the dynamic tax code. The marginal tax benefit function is
completed by “connecting the dots” created by the 17 discrete levels of interest deduction.
13As an alternative to using this random walk with drift model to forecast future taxable income, we
construct benefit functions based on the bin forecasting model of Blouin, Core and Guay (2009). Using this
alternative approach does not change our qualitative conclusions.
16
Note that the area under the benefit function up to the 100% point represents the gross tax
benefit of debt for a given firm in a given year for its chosen capital structure, ignoring all
costs.
These steps are replicated for each firm for each year, to produce a panel of firm-year tax
benefit functions for each year from 1980 to 2007. The benefit functions in this panel vary
across firms. They can also vary through time for a given firm as the tax code or the firm’s
circumstances change.
II.B Corporate Financial Statement Data
We obtain corporate financial statement data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database
from 1980 to 2007 and calculate tax benefit functions for 126,611 firm-year observations. We
normalize interest expense by total book assets, which hereafter we refer to as interest-over-
book (IOB). Control variables collateral (COL), intangible assets (INTANG), and cash
flow (CF ) are also normalized by total book assets. For the construction of LTA, we chain
total book assets to 2000 dollars to adjust for inflation before taking logarithms. We further
remove any firms with negative book asset value, common equity, capital, sales, or dividends.
Such firms have either unreliable Compustat data or are likely to be distressed or severely
unprofitable and therefore constrained with respect to accessing financial markets. Next, we
delete observations that are involved in substantial M&A activity, defined as acquisitions
amounting to over 15% of total assets. Third, we remove outliers defined as firm-year
observations that are in the first and 99th percentile tails for (i) area under the marginal
benefits curve (AREA), (ii) the observed interest-over-book (IOB), (iii) the book to market
ratio (BTM), and (iv) the cashflow over assets ratio (CF ).14 Finally we remove all firms
in the financial and insurance, utilities, and public administration industries because they
tend to be heavily regulated. This results in a sample of 91,687 firm-years, of which 79,942
14Removing the outliers of the other control variables (COL, LTA, INTANG, and DDIV ) does not
change the distribution of the sample much.
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have non-missing data for IOB and all control variables. Table I provides an overview of
the sample construction.
[INSERT TABLE I]
For each firm, we create empirical measures of the following control variables: asset
collateralizability (plant, property, equipment and inventory) over total book assets (COL),
log of total book assets (LTA), book equity to market equity (BTM), intangible assets over
total book assets (INTANG), cash flow over total book assets (CF ), and an indicator for
a dividend paying firm (DDIV ). We measure financial distress by a modified version of
Altman’s (1968) Z-score (ZSCORE). Firms are conservatively defined to be non-distressed
if they have ZSCOREs in the top tercile. We measure financial constraint as having limited
long-term leverage adjustments, collectively referred to as LTDEIR.15 This approach allows
us to address issues related to fixed adjustment costs, as discussed below. Appendix B
provides a detailed description of the construction of the control variables.
II.C Data Samples, Financial Constraint, and Financial Distress
We perform our empirical analysis on two primary samples:
Sample A : All firm-year observations with non-missing marginal benefit curves, interest over
book values, and all control variables.
Sample B : Financially non-distressed and unconstrained firms: ZSCORE in top tercile and
equity or long term debt issuances and/or repurchases (LTDEIR) in top tercile.
Long-term debt and equity issuances and reductions, hereafter collectively referred to
as LTDEIR, are obtained from the statement of cash flows and normalized by total book
15We also look at two other definitions for financial constraint offered in the literature: (i) the Cleary
(1999) index (CL), and (ii) the Whited and Wu (2006) index (WW ). These are discussed in Section VI.
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assets. Firms are defined to be financially unconstrained in Sample B, captured by the
dummy variable, UNFC, if they have any long-term debt issuance (DISS), long-term
debt reduction (DRED), equity issuance (EISS), or equity reduction (ERED), i.e., any
capital structure adjustments, that are in the top tercile.16 A conservative cutoff of one-third
makes it more likely that the firms in our estimation sample are able to make unconstrained
(optimal) choices. However, the actual cutoff of the top tercile is arbitrary and is not crucial
to our estimation results. Our main results do not change if we loosen or tighten the definition
and include firms above the median or 75th percentile (see Section VI). Summary statistics
for UNFC and the four separate measures are presented in Table II.
There are two reasons that we focus our attention on Sample B. First, our empirical
approach assumes that observed debt ratios represent equilibrium choices. Compared to
constrained or distressed firms, the observations in Sample B are relatively likely to represent
unconstrained, long-term capital structure equilibria. Of course, one could argue that the
constrained and distressed firms included in Sample A also make optimal choices, possibly
in response to steeper cost functions. In this way of thinking, comparing the results across
the samples will highlight the differing costs facing distressed and constrained firms.
The second reason that we focus on Sample B is to attenuate the effect of observations
that might be severely affected by fixed adjustment costs. Recent research highlights that
firms might not continuously fine-tune their leverage ratios due to non-negligible adjustment
costs (Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner, 1989; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Kurshev and Strebulaev,
2006; etc.), which can lead to data that reflect passive, or no change, observations. Sample B
avoids this issue by only including firm-year observations for which there is substantial long-
term debt and/or equity issuance, or repurchase observations for which fixed transactions
did not constrain the firm into inaction. Overall, relative to Sample A, Sample B should be
relatively free of the effects of financial constraints, financial distress, and fixed adjustment
costs and thus we can interpret observations as representing “equilibrium choices.” Table II
16All four variables are scaled by book value.
19
presents the summary statistics for both samples.
[INSERT TABLE II]
III Estimation Results
As described in Section I.B, we estimate the marginal cost curve for two main specifications:
(i) Panel Approach, (ii) 1986 Tax Reform Act. We repeat specification (i) with firm fixed
effects and year fixed effects, which we denote as specifications (iii) and (iv), respectively.
Tables III and IV report the estimation results of these specifications for Samples B and
A, respectively. All control variables, except DDIV , are standardized (i.e., have mean zero
and standard deviation of one within Sample A) so that the coefficients have a one standard
deviation interpretation. DDIV is a binary variable with values of {0,1}.
[INSERT TABLE III]
[INSERT TABLE IV]
We analyze the estimation results in detail below, but first discuss some overarching
issues. The signs on the coefficients of the cost control variables are consistent across
samples and specifications. It is worth noting that, compared to panel specification (i),
the slope is somewhat larger in TRA86 specification (ii), but the intercepts are smaller. So
relatively speaking, the MC curve pivots upward in specification (ii). Thus, it is hard to
say unambiguously that one estimated MC curve dominates the other (because slope and
intercept effects offset). Furthermore, compared to specification (i), the standard errors in
specification (ii) are larger. This is expected given that much capital structure variation
is cross-sectional (Lemmon, Roberts, Zender, 2008) and not captured in specification (ii).
Nonetheless, the qualitative similarity across these two approaches is reassuring.
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Within our framework, the capital structure decision follows from a tradeoff between the
costs and benefits of debt. It is important to highlight that our marginal benefit curves
only measure the tax benefits of debt. As a consequence, the other benefits of debt, such as
committing managers to operate efficiently (Jensen, 1986) and engaging lenders to monitor
the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), are included as negative costs, and therefore are
reflected in our estimated marginal cost curves. Our cost curves also include the traditional
costs of debt, such as the cost of financial distress (Scott, 1976), debt overhang (Myers, 1977),
agency conflicts between managers and investors, and any other cost or nontax benefits that
are reflected in the optimal debt choices. As noted in the introduction, there is ambiguity
regarding which agent optimizes debt policy (e.g., managers versus shareholders), and we do
not attempt to determine the identity of the optimizing agent.
Below we interpret the cost coefficients embedded in the cost of debt functions, and
compare the implications from these coefficients to capital structure regularities documented
in the literature. For expositional reasons we henceforth focus on the analysis of Sample B
for specification (i), the panel identification approach. Table V summarizes the effect of the
control variables on the cost of debt function, and compares these coefficients to standard
capital structure results (as presented in Frank and Goyal (2009) and elsewhere). As we
highlight below when we discuss the individual control variables, the effects of the control
variables on the cost of debt function are consistent with debt usage implications in the
existing capital structure literature. This is reassuring, in spite of the fact that we take a
different approach and have a different dependent variable (y∗i,t) than the existing literature.
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As for the sign of any given coefficient, there are still open questions in the capital structure
literature in terms of interpreting individual coefficients, and by no means does our procedure
resolve all the open questions. Rather, our procedure quantifies just how large the influence
of individual variables on the cost of debt must be to explain observed capital structure
17Our approach has a measure of debt on the right hand side, while in the traditional approach debt is on
the left hand side as dependent variable. The coefficients we estimate should have the opposite sign to be
consistent with estimates from the traditional approach.
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choices.
[INSERT TABLE V]
III.A Marginal Cost Curves
In this section, we discuss the estimated cost curves. Based on panel identification strategy
(i), the typical firm has a cost curve of debt with an estimated slope of 4.810 and estimated
intercept of 0.112. That is, when control variables are set to their mean values (of zero since
they are standardized) and DDIV is set to 0, the estimated slope of the interest-over-book
variable equals 4.810 and the estimated intercept is 0.112. Therefore, if IOB changes from
0.02 to 0.03, the marginal cost of taking on this additional debt would be 16.0 cents ( =
4.810*0.01 + 0.112 ) per dollar of interest.18
The -0.040 coefficient on COL implies that high collateral firms have a lower cost of
debt. All else being equal, a lower cost of debt should lead to higher debt usage, which is
consistent with the positive relation between COL and debt ratios found in the standard
capital structure literature, as shown in Table V. Further, all else equal, a firm that has
COL one standard deviation larger than the average faces a marginal cost intercept of 0.072
as opposed to 0.112 (as shown in Figure 3).
The 0.016 coefficient on LTA indicates that large firms face a higher cost of debt. Holding
all else constant, a firm that has LTA one standard deviation higher than the average faces an
intercept of 0.128 as opposed to 0.112. This might initially seem surprising because it implies
that large firms face higher costs of debt or at least make choices as if they do. However,
note that our result is consistent with recent research that indicates that, all else equal,
large firms use less debt (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Kurshev and Strebulaev, 2006).19
18Recall that the intercept of the marginal cost curve equals the slope of the total cost curve, and the
slope of the marginal cost curve equals the convexity of the total cost curve.
19Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006) argue that fixed costs of external financing lead to infrequent
restructuring and create a wedge between small and large firms. Small firms choose proportionally more
leverage at the moment of refinancing to compensate for less frequent rebalancing.
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In contrast, other research (as summarized in Frank and Goyal, 2009) documents a positive
relation between size and debt usage. The differing firm size implications documented in
various capital structure papers implies that the influence of size on the costs versus benefits
of debt varies in different settings and samples. In our sample, larger firms use less debt
(ceteris paribus) which is consistent with a higher cost of debt.
Firms with growth opportunities (i.e., low book-to-market (BTM)) on average face a
higher cost of debt (coefficient of -0.018). This is consistent with the common finding that
for growth firms the opportunity cost of debt is high because debt can restrict a firm’s ability
to exercise future growth opportunities due to debt overhang (Myers, 1977). The inflexibility
arising from debt covenants could also restrict a firm’s ability to optimally invest and exercise
growth options, effectively increasing the cost of debt.
The coefficients on the other variables also have implications that are similar to extant
capital structure research (see Table A). The -0.025 coefficient on INTANG suggest that
firms with more intangible assets face lower costs of debt, consistent with intangibles
supporting debt claims in ways similar to collaterizable assets. The 0.085 coefficient on
CF implies that firms with high cash flow behave as though they face higher costs by using
less debt, consistent with implications from the pecking order theory. Finally, the 0.064
coefficient on DDIV indicates that dividend paying firms face higher costs of debt, perhaps
because dividends are rarely omitted (Brav et al., 2005), and therefore, all else being equal,
leave fewer funds to cover interest obligations.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
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IV Firm-Specific Costs and Optimal Capital Structure
Using the estimated coefficients from the panel specification, in column (i) of Table III, the
marginal cost of debt for any particular firm i at time t can be computed by:
MC(IOB) = α+ β ∗ IOB (12)
with
α = 0.112− 0.040 COL + 0.016 LTA− 0.018 BTM − 0.025 INTANG + 0.085 CF + 0.064 DDIV
β = 4.810
Each of the control variables, except DDIV , is standardized (demeaned and divided by the
standard deviation) to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. DDIV is
a binary variable with values of {0,1}. The mean and standard deviation for each of the
non-standardized control variables are reported below:
COL LTA BTM INTANG CF
Mean 0.497 5.048 0.762 0.058 0.093
Std. Dev. 0.230 2.167 0.628 0.106 0.154
Equation (12) provides a linear approximation for ex-ante firm-specific MC curves of
debt. To be precise, the computation of the firm-specific marginal cost of debt functions also
requires values for orthogonal cost shocks, ξi,t in equation (1). Equation (12) assumes that
ξi,t is zero.
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Equation (12) can be used to estimate the marginal cost of debt for a firm at any given
level of debt (IOB). Thus, equation (12) allows us to compare marginal costs across firms or
subsets of firms, and, when combined with the marginal benefit curves of debt, draw inference
20This does not preclude making individual adjustments to specific firms if information outside of the
empirical model is available.
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about optimal capital structure. Moreover, the estimated marginal cost curve includes not
only expected bankruptcy costs, but all costs that are relevant to a firm’s capital structure
decision. Therefore equation (12) can be used in future capital structure research to estimate
debt costs.
IV.A The Representative Firm
[INSERT TABLE VI]
In Table VI and Figure 4 we show the marginal benefit and cost curves for the average
(representative) firm in Samples A and B using data from 1980 to 2007. The marginal cost
curves are derived using equation (12). For Sample A, we set the control variables equal
to their average values (0 for all controls except DDIV , which has an average of 0.389) to
arrive at the cost curve of debt for the average firm. For Sample B, we calculate the average
standardized values for each control variable, using the means and standard deviations from
the table above. We then apply these values to equation (12). To obtain the average marginal
benefit curve, we compute the sample average marginal tax rate and interest over book value
at 0%, 20%, 40%, ..., 1000% of the observed IOB.
[INSERT FIGURE 4]
Figure 4 indicates that, on average, firms in Sample B are in equilibrium, as we assumed
in the sample estimation. Sample A also includes financially constrained and distressed firms.
Relative to Sample B, the average marginal benefit curve in Sample A is shifted downward,
and the representative firm is slightly overlevered. TheMB andMC data presented in Table
VI can be used by researchers to calibrate models of aggregate capital structure behavior.
IV.B Case Studies
Once the cost and benefit functions have been estimated, they can be used to analyze firm-
specific capital structure. We illustrate two case studies, chosen for expositional purposes:
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i) Hasbro, Inc., and ii) Black & Decker. The marginal cost curves are derived using
equation (12), where, as mentioned above, the idiosyncratic shock, ξi,t is set to zero.
IV.B.1 Hasbro, Inc.
[INSERT FIGURE 5]
The first panel of Table VII displays the decile rankings of financial ratios for Hasbro, Inc.
in 1990, 1999, and 2007. Hasbro is a large, family leisure product manufacturing company
that consistently pays dividends and has relatively high intangible assets. From 1990 to
1999, Hasbro’s intangibles doubled and book-to-market ratio almost halved. The increase in
intangibles decreased the marginal cost of debt, while the increase in growth opportunities
raised the marginal cost, with the net effect of a lower marginal cost curve. From 1999
to 2007, Hasbro’s intangibles decreased, cash flows increased, and the company’s book-to-
market ratio decreased. All three effectively increased the marginal cost of debt, resulting in
a higher marginal cost of debt curve (the firm-specific intercept of the marginal cost curve
decreased from 0.247 in 1990 to 0.222 in 1999 and increased to 0.280 in 2007).
Consistent with these changes in marginal cost, Hasbro’s model-implied optimal interest-
over-book increased from 0.019 in 1990 to 0.027 in 1999 and decreased to 0.016 by 2007 (see
Figure 5). In 1990 Hasbro chose an actual IOB that is approximately at the model-implied
“equilibrium,” i.e., the point where the estimated marginal cost and marginal benefit curves
intersect. In 1999, Hasbro increased actual debt usage, consistent with a reduction in costs,
though the firm did not use the full amount of debt that the model implies it should. By
2007, the firm changed debt in the direction recommended by the model and operated at
the model-implied equilibrium level of debt.
IV.B.2 Black & Decker
[INSERT FIGURE 6]
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The second panel of Table VII displays fundamentals for Black & Decker in 1990, 1999,
and 2007. Black & Decker is a large firm that pays dividends and has stable sales. The
firm’s low collateral and intangible assets suggest high marginal costs based on our estimation
results (Table III), and the model recommends less debt than Black and Decker uses in 1990.
That is, relative to the model implied debt ratio, Black and Decker was overlevered in 1990.
This excessive debt stems from Black and Decker’s highly levered acquisition of Emhart
Corporation in 1989. In the mid 1990s, Black and Decker issued equity in order to pay down
its debt.21 Thus by 1999, Black and Decker’s actual leverage had decreased and the firm had
moved closer to its model-implied optimal debt ratio. In 2007, the firm was in equilibrium
given that its actual IOB coincides with the model-implied interest-over-book-assets ratio.
[INSERT TABLE VII]
V Quantifying the Costs and Benefits of Debt
As seen in Section IV, the intersection of the estimated marginal benefit and marginal cost
functions can be used to determine “optimal” or “equilibrium” interest over book for a
given firm. This allows us to infer how a given firm’s chosen debt level compares to model
recommended debt usage. We refer to a company as being overlevered (underlevered) if its
observed debt usage is too high (low) relative to the optimum implied by the coefficients
of our empirical model. Strictly speaking, this “optimum” should be interpreted as the
representative debt ratio for firms with characteristics similar to the firm under consideration,
based on coefficients estimated on Sample B. Recall that our cost of debt curve is an ex-ante
measure that effectively assumes expected cost shocks are zero after controlling for the cost
environment using firm specific characteristics. In other words, we have effectively assumed
throughout that firms in Sample B operate in equilibrium, on average.22
21Source: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE3DB1E3CF930A25750C0A964958260
22Deviations from the model-implied equilibrium for Sample B firms can be interpreted either as noise or
as idiosyncratic firm-year biases (which average to zero).
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In this section, we analyze all the firms in Sample A. For expositional ease, we refer to the
financially distressed or constrained firms that have chosen debt ratios that deviate from the
model-implied optimum as being overlevered and underlevered. An alternative interpretation
is that the constrained and distressed firms are correctly levered, given the options available
to them. In this interpretation, the results in this section should be interpreted as indicating
the cost that financial constraint or distress imposes on a company, in terms of preventing
the firm from operating at the long-run, unconstrained, undistressed equilibrium (that is
reflected in the choices and coefficient estimates of Sample B firms).
Equipped with our marginal benefit and marginal cost curves, and with these
interpretation issues in mind, we now quantify the gross benefits and costs of debt, net
benefits of debt, and the costs of being “out of equilibrium.”
V.A Gross and Net Benefits of Debt
[INSERT FIGURE 7]
The observed (equilibrium) gross benefits of debt, GBDo (GBDe), is the area under the
marginal benefit curve up to the observed (equilibrium) level of interest over book value
(IOB). The observed (equilibrium) cost of debt, CDo (CDe), is the area under the marginal
cost curve up to the observed (equilibrium) level of IOB. The observed (equilibrium) net
benefit of debt, NBDo (NBDe), is the difference between the gross benefit of debt and the
cost of debt (i.e., the area between the curves, up to the observed (equilibrium) level of IOB).
Cost measures are based on equation (12), which uses coefficient estimates of the marginal
cost curve from Sample B, as presented in column (i) of Table III. Figure 7 illustrates how
we measure the equilibrium gross benefit of debt, cost of debt, and net benefit of debt.23
[INSERT TABLE VIII]
23Recall from footnote 2 that the benefit function measures the gross tax benefit of debt, and the cost
function captures the cost of debt net of any non-tax benefits. Also, our net benefit measure is equivalent
to the difference between a function that captures all benefits of debt and a cost function that captures all
costs of debt; that is, we measure the net all-in benefit of debt.
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Panel A of Table VIII reports the unconditional summary statistics for the gross benefit,
cost, and net benefit of debt for all firm-year observations in Sample A. Recall that this
analysis includes constrained and distressed firms that were excluded in the estimation
of equation (12). All values are reported as percentages of book value in perpetuity; for
example, a gross benefit of 5% would occur if the annual benefit was 0.5% and the discount
rate was 0.10.24 We see that the average gross benefit of debt is higher at the equilibrium
levels of debt (10.4%) than at the observed levels (9.0%). In contrast, the average cost of debt
is lower at the equilibrium levels (6.9%) than at the observed levels (7.9%). These numbers
imply that the net benefit of debt would be larger if firms were to operate at the equilibria
implied by our analysis, relative to their observed levels: on average, the net benefit of debt
at the implied equilibrium is 3.5% of book value in perpetuity versus 1.1% at observed debt
levels.25 Although 3.5% of book value seems modest, for a portion of the sample, the net
benefits of debt are large. Figure 8a presents a histogram of firms sorted according to their
equilibrium gross benefit of debt and paired with their corresponding equilibrium cost of
debt. Firms above the 95th percentile have net benefits of debt that average 10.8% of book
value at equilibrium levels. Figure 8b shows the time series of the equilibrium gross and net
benefits of debt for all firms and for firms with high (above median) equilibrium net benefits
of debt. The decrease in benefits around 1987 is the result of the reduction in corporate
marginal tax rates following the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
The mean observed (equilibrium) cost of debt is 7.9% (6.9%) of book asset value (see
Table VIII). It is worth noting that the observed cost of debt is as high as 17.8% (41.0%) of
asset value for firms in the 90th (99th) percentile of the cost distribution, much higher than
the ex ante equilibrium cost of debt of 13.7% (17.7%) of asset value for firms in the 90th
24We use the Moody’s average corporate bond yield as the discount rate for all firms in a given year.
25As mentioned in Footnote 1, the cost of debt functions include non-tax benefits of debt, and therefore
can be thought of as lower bound cost estimates. That is, if all benefits of debt were captured in the
benefit function and no benefits were captured as negative costs, both the cost and benefit functions would
shift upward relative to our curves. However, the area between the curves would not be affected. Thus,
while non-tax benefits can affect the location and interpretation of the cost function, this does not alter the
interpretation of the area between the benefit and cost functions as representing the net benefit of debt. In
our estimates, therefore, the area between the curves measures the all-in net benefit of debt.
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(99th) percentile.
[INSERT FIGURE 8]
V.B Cost of Being Underlevered or Overlevered
Our analysis allows us to address the question: how costly is it for firms to operate out of
capital structure equilibrium? The cost of being “overlevered” can provide insights into the
potential cost of financial distress, while the cost of being “underlevered” can shed light on
the cost of financial constraints or managerial conservatism. The cost of being overlevered,
DWo, is the deadweight loss measured as the area between the cost and benefit curves when
a firm has more debt than recommended by our model (see Figure 7d). The cost of being
underlevered, DWu, is the deadweight loss from leaving money on the table due to using less
debt than implied by the model. Recall that one interpretation of DWu is that it represents
the value lost from suboptimal debt usage (relative to unconstrained debt usage) imposed
by financial constraints limiting the amount of debt a firm can use.
Panel B of Table VIII reports DWo and DWu for firms that are financially distressed
and/or constrained (firms in Sample A, but not in Sample B). The table shows that on
average the cost of overlevering is 3.8% of book value in perpetuity, while the average cost of
underlevering is 1.4%. This asymmetry of higher costs to being overlevered than underlevered
is consistent with the rebalancing behavior documented in Leary and Roberts (2005).
In extreme cases (99th percentile), the capitalized cost of overlevering can be as high as
30.1% of book value, while the cost of being underlevered reaches only 8.1%. Note that the
cost of overleverage is 10.6% at the 90th percentile. These numbers are in the same ballpark
as the 10% to 23% of firm value estimates of the ex post cost of distress for the 31 highly
leveraged transactions studied by Andrade and Kaplan (1998).
[INSERT FIGURE 9]
30
One way to conceptualize the cost of being under- or overlevered is to study companies
that operate at or near their model-implied equilibrium and examine what the implied cost
of debt would be if they were to hypothetically lever up or down. Table IX summarizes
the cost of being underlevered or overlevered if firms that are currently within 5% of their
equilibrium were to hypothetically change their IOB to X% of their equilibrium IOB. Panel
A analyzes Sample A firms that operate near their model-implied equilibrium. As expected,
the gross benefit of debt and cost of debt increase with IOB. As seen before, the numbers
reveal that the cost of debt is disproportionately higher if a firm were to overlever versus
underlever. If firms were to hypothetically move away from their equilibria by doubling their
leverage, they would on average face a deadweight cost of 6.2% of book value. On the other
hand, if firms were to hypothetically move away from their equilibria by eliminating their
debt, they would face a deadweight cost of 4.5%. These results are shown in Figure 9. The
asymmetrically larger costs of overleverage may help explain at least partially why some
firms might use debt conservatively.
[INSERT TABLE IX]
The 1999 and 2007 Black and Decker graphs in Figure 6 help convey the intuition of why
the cost of overleverage is asymmetrically higher than the cost of underleverage. Starting at
the equilibrium point, the benefit function is flat as one moves to the left and approaches
the y-axis, which limits the cost of underleverage. In contrast, the benefit function decreases
as one moves to the right into overleverage territory (until it reaches 0); therefore there is
more area between the curves as you move from the equilibrium point to the right versus
to the left. Note that this is not an artifact of the way we do our analysis. Rather, the
structure of the US tax code (with less than full tax loss offsets) contributes importantly to
the asymmetrically larger cost of overleverage.
Panel B and panel C of Table IX present the hypothetical results for investment grade
and speculative grade firms that are within 5% of being in equilibrium. For both sets of firms,
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the cost of being overlevered is again larger than being underlevered (see Figure 9). The
asymmetry between the cost of being overlevered versus being underlevered is minimal for
investment grade firms and is more severe for junk rated firms. These results are reassuring
in that this analysis implies that speculative rated firms face higher marginal costs than do
investment grade firms.
[INSERT FIGURE 10]
Finally, Figure 10 presents the “value gained from capital structure” graph that appears in
Myers (1984) and in most corporate finance textbooks (e.g., Graham, Smart, and Megginson,
2010). The value function is humped-shaped because capital structure adds value up to
the optimal point (the intersection of the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves), then
declines after that point. We use our empirical estimates to calibrate this well-known graph,
based on firms that operate within ±5% of model-implied optimal debt usage, and separately
for firms that have high net benefits of debt. One previously unanswered question about
the value graph is whether it is flat, and over what region; that is, how much value is lost if
a firm does not make an capital structure choice? Our results indicate that for the typical
near-equilibrium firm, optimal capital structure increases firm value by 4.5% of book assets
on average, and by 5.9% of book assets for high net benefit firms. As mentioned earlier, the
value reaches more than 11% for one in twenty firms (see Figure 8a). The value function is
fairly flat if a typical firm were to operate within ±20% of the optimum.
V.C Benchmarks and Reality Checks
[INSERT FIGURE 11]
In Section V.A, we showed that the 90th and 99th percentile ex ante cost of debt numbers
that we estimate are comparable to the ex post estimates in Andrade and Kaplan (1998). In
Section V.B, we showed that the cost of hypothetical overleverage is higher for junk rated
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firms relative to costs for investment grade firms. We now provide another benchmark by
comparing our results to the recent literature on default costs of debt. This exercise allows
us to quantify the importance of default costs among all costs of debt, and to back out the
implied magnitude of costs other than those for default. It also serves as a benchmark to
ensure that our numbers are sensible.
Almeida and Phillippon (2007) argue that firms are more likely to face financial distress
in bad times when marginal utility is high, and thus the cost of distress should reflect this.
They measure the net present value of distress costs using risk adjusted default probabilities
calculated for corporate bond spreads (see Table IV of their paper). Figure 11a compares
their risk-adjusted distress costs as a percentage of firm value to our measure of the ex ante
cost of debt as a percentage of firm value for AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B rated firms over their
sample period from 1985 to 2004. It is comforting that our cost of debt numbers are in the
same general ballpark as the Almeida and Phillippon calculations. Our cost of debt estimate
is larger than the Almeida and Phillippon calculations because our numbers include more
than just default costs. Based on this comparison, expected default costs of debt amount to
approximately half of the total costs of debt. Agency and other costs constitute the other
half of the cost of debt.
As an additional exercise, we also perform this analysis for three time periods. Figure
11b compares the Almeida and Phillippon cost of distress against our cost of debt for the
following periods: 1980 to 1986, 1989 to 1996, and 1998 to 2007. Periods 1980 to 1986
and 1989 to 1996 are similar to each other. In the period 1998 to 2007, agency and other
non-default costs of debt appear to have fallen for investment grade firms (i.e., our estimate
is near Almeida and Phillippon’s). Thus, either the true costs of debt fell after 1998 and/or
corporate debt choices were made less conservatively for credit ratings BBB and higher.
Though we present aggregated numbers in Figure 11 to allow comparison to Almeida
and Phillippon (2007), we emphasize that one advantage of our approach is that we can also
estimate firm-specific costs of debt.
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VI Robustness Checks
VI.A Assessing Other Capital Structure Theories
In this section we address research that explores the effect of specific factors on the cost of
debt. Each of the theories involves the inclusion of an additional control variable. It turns
out that these extra variables either (i) are redundant with other control variables in the
cross section or time series, or (ii) have low data quality. For these reasons, we have not
included them in the main analysis presented above. However, these examples illustrate that
our framework can potentially be used to analyze implications from various capital structure
theories.
VI.A.1 Macroeconomic Influences
Chen (2008) and Almeida and Philippon (2007) propose that bankruptcies are concentrated
in bad times, i.e., periods when marginal utilities are high. This leads investors to demand
higher credit risk premia during bad times due to higher default rates and higher default
losses. This naturally suggests that credit spreads should play a role in the time variation
of the cost of debt.
Table X presents analysis when Moody’s Baa-Aaa credit spread (CS) is included as a
control variable. When the spread is high, we expect the cost of debt to be high. Thus,
we expect a positive sign on the credit spread variable. We see that this is indeed the case;
the estimated 0.026 coefficient is statistically significant. Note that this analysis is infeasible
when including year dummies or when using an identification strategy that relies on time
series information (such as specification (iv) in Table III).
VI.A.2 Personal Tax Penalty
Miller (1977), Green and Hollifield (2003), and others argue that despite the corporate
tax deduction from using debt, investors pay higher taxes on interest income, leading to a
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personal tax penalty for corporate tax usage. If investors face higher interest income tax
relative to capital gains tax, they will demand a premium for holding debt, which would be
reflected in the cost of debt and deter firms from using debt, all else being equal. Graham
(1999) shows that when empirically modeling debt ratios, a specification that adjusts for the
personal tax penalty statistically dominates specifications that do not. Following Graham’s
(1999) method of measuring the personal tax penalty (PTP ), we include this measure in
our analysis as an additional cost control variable.
Table X presents the coefficients for the marginal cost curve when including the personal
tax penalty (PTP ) as a control variable. We see that firms that face a high personal tax
penalty do indeed face higher marginal costs of debt (the coefficient indicates aMC function
with an intercept 0.037 larger). This is consistent with Graham’s (1999) findings. However,
the PTP variable is sensitive to outliers, and does not affect other implications, so we exclude
it from the main specification.
[INSERT TABLE X]
VI.B Time Period Subsamples
In Section I.B, we introduce two identification strategies to estimate the marginal cost of debt
curve. The panel approach, specification (i), uses the area under the marginal tax benefit
curve, AREA, as the identifying instrument. As previously mentioned, a main advantage
of using specification (i) is that it uses both time-series and cross-sectional information.
Therefore, this specification can be applied to any time period, even eras without tax regime
changes, to identify the marginal cost of debt. Table XI provides the results for the estimation
of the marginal cost curve as specified in equation (1) for the periods 1980-1986 (pre-TRA
1986), 1989-1997 (post-TRA 1986), 1998-2007 (recent period), and 1980-2007 with year
dummies.26 In all four cases, we are able to identify and obtain reasonable estimates using
26By including year dummies in Table XI, we remove time series influences and use only cross-sectional
information to identify the cost curves.
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only cross-sectional information.
[INSERT TABLE XI]
VI.C Alternative Financial Constraint and Distress Measures
As discussed previously, our estimation procedure relies on the assumption that
unconstrained and non-distressed firms optimize their capital structures. Previously, we used
the lack of a change in long-term debt or equity as an indication of financial constraint. As
additional robustness checks, we also identify unconstrained firms based on the Cleary (1999)
index, hereafter CL, and the Whited and Wu (2006) index, hereafter WW . Separately, we
also loosen (tighten) our definition of being financially unconstrained to include only firms
that have made long-term debt or equity adjustments (LTDEIR) in the top half (quartile),
as opposed to the top tercile. Finally, we loosen (tighten) the definition of being financially
non-distressed to include firms with ZSCOREs in the top half (quartile).
Cleary (1999) calculates a general financial constraint measure by grouping firms into
categories based on whether they increase or decrease dividend payments. Using this
classification procedure, Cleary (1999) performs discriminant analysis to measure financial
constraint. We reproduce this procedure over our sample period of 1980 to 2007 to obtain the
coefficients for a CL index. In a recent paper, Whited and Wu (2006) derive an alternative
measure of financial constraint by formulating the dynamic optimization problem of a firm
that faces the constraint that the distributions of the firm (e.g., dividends) need to exceed
a certain lower bound. They parameterize the Lagrange multiplier on this constraint and
estimate its coefficients with GMM. Effectively, the WW index indicates that a firm is
financially constrained if its sales growth is considerably lower than its industry’s sales
growth. In other words, a constrained firm is a slow-growing firm in a fast-growing industry.
Note that the higher the indices, the more constrained the firm.
In summary, in addition to using Sample A and Sample B throughout the paper, we also
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perform our analysis using the following samples:
C : CL in bottom tercile and ZSCORE in top tercile,
D : WW in bottom tercile and ZSCORE in top tercile,
E : LTDEIR above median and ZSCORE above median, and
F : LTDEIR in top quartile and ZSCORE in top quartile.
The estimation results are presented in Table XII. The slopes range from 3.491 to 5.578
and the intercepts range from 0.086 to 0.192 for the estimation of equation (1). These are
similar to the results we obtain in Table III. Furthermore, the qualitative and quantitative
results on all control variables except BTM match fairly well. For Sample D where the
BTM coefficient is positive, the estimate is insignificant. Overall, the robustness analyses
produce results that are largely consistent with those in the main analysis.
[INSERT TABLE XII]
VII Conclusion
We use panel data from 1980 to 2007 to estimate the marginal cost function for corporate
debt. We simulate debt tax benefit curves and assume that for financially unconstrained
and non-distressed firms, the marginal benefit curve intersects the marginal cost curve at
the observed level of debt, on average. Using this equilibrium condition, exogenous shifts
by the benefit curves enable us to identify the marginal cost function. We employ two
identification strategies: (i) a full panel approach using all time-series and cross-sectional
information from 1980 to 2007, (ii) a time series approach focused on the 1986 Tax Reform
Act.
The estimated marginal cost curves are positively sloped. The intercept depends on firm
characteristics such as collateral, size, book-to-market, intangibles, cash flows, and whether
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the firm pays dividends. As such, our framework provides a new parsimonious environment
to evaluate competing capital structure theories. Our findings are robust to firm fixed effects,
year fixed effects, across time periods, and when accounting for fixed adjustment costs of
debt. We provide an easy-to-use formula that allows for the implementation of firm-specific
marginal cost functions. We also provide firm-specific recommendations of optimal debt
policy against which firms’ actual debt choices can be benchmarked, and we quantify the
welfare costs to the firm from deviating from the model-recommended optimum.
Our estimates indicate that the optimal capitalized net benefits of debt are about 3.5% of
asset value. We also find that the cost of overlevering is greater than the cost of underlevering.
Finally, our estimates are benchmarked to several papers, including Almeida and Phillippon
(2007). We find that default cost of debt amounts to approximately half of total cost of
debt, implying that agency costs and other non-default costs contribute about half of the
total ex ante costs of debt.
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Appendix A
In this appendix, we present the first and second stage 2SLS equations in the estimation
of the marginal cost of debt curve as presented in equation (1), and discuss the first stage
regression results.
In the first stage, equilibrium leverage, x∗, is regressed on the identifying instrument, z,
and the set of control variables, C:
x∗i,t = β0 + βzzi,t +
∑
c∈C
βcci,t + νi,t. (A.1)
We obtain fitted values from the first stage regression, xˆ. In the second stage, we regress
equilibrium marginal cost, y∗, on the fitted values from the first stage, xˆ, and control
variables, C:
y∗i,t = a + bxˆi,t +
∑
c∈C
θcci,t + ωi,t. (A.2)
To provide further insight into these identification strategies, we present the first stage
regression results in Table A.I.
In the panel approach, we use the area under the marginal benefit curve, AREA, as the
identifying instrument. Holding the marginal cost curve constant, we expect an outward shift
of the marginal benefit curve (which is downward sloping) to result in an increase in leverage.
Indeed, the coefficient onAREA is positive and significant. In the second specification we use
the TRA86 variable, as defined in the main text, over the period 1980-2007 as the identifying
instrument. As the new tax regime was implemented, tax rates decreased making leverage
less attractive. We therefore expect a negative sign on TRA86, which is what we find.27
Note that the estimated coefficients for the control variables have the same signs as those
estimated in the extant capital structure literature (see Table V).
27We note that this provides some of the first purely time-series evidence that taxes affect corporate capital
structure decisions (as called for by Graham (2003)).
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Table A.I: First stage regression estimated on unconstrained and non-distressed firms (Sample B). In the first stage regressions, x∗i,t is regressed on z
and C, where x∗i,t is the observed interest expenses over book value (IOB), z is the identifying instrument, and C is the set of cost control variables.
We consider two main specifications: (i) panel approach, z ≡ {AREA} and (ii) 1986 Tax Reform Act, z ≡ {TRA86}. The set of control variables is
C ≡ {COL,LTA,BTM, INTANG,CF,DDIV }. COL is collateralizable assets over total book values, LTA is log of total assets expressed in 2000
dollars, BTM is book equity to market equity, INTANG is intangible assets over total book values, CF is net cashflow over total book values, and
DDIV is an indicator for dividend paying firms. All control variables, except DDIV , are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation
one based on all firms (Sample A). DDIV is a binary variable with values {0,1}. Robust, clustered standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year, as in Thompson (2009) and Petersen (2009). Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, 5%
level by **, and 1% level by ***.
x∗i,t = β0 + βzzi,t +
∑
c∈C βcci,t + νi,t
(i) z ≡ {AREA} (ii) z ≡ {TRA86}
Constant 0.0233 *** Constant 0.0430 ***
(0.0010) (0.0014)
COL 0.0062 *** COL 0.0083 ***
(0.0004) (0.0005)
LTA -0.0016 *** LTA -0.0015 **
(0.0004) (0.0005)
BTM 0.0035 *** BTM 0.0027 ***
(0.0005) (0.0006)
INTANG 0.0026 *** INTANG 0.0039 ***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
CF -0.0110 *** CF -0.0048 ***
(0.0007) (0.0007)
DDIV -0.0066 *** DDIV -0.0067 ***
(0.0006) (0.0008)
AREA 0.3611 *** TRA86 -0.0091 ***
(0.0179) (0.0016)
No. Obs. 12704 No. Obs. 12883
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Appendix B
A detailed description follows of the construction of the control variables used in the
analysis and variables included in the summary statistics reported in Table II. Numbers
in parentheses indicate the corresponding Compustat annual industrial data items.
Collateralizable assets, COL = Total Inventories (3) + Net Plant, Property, and Equipment (8)Total Book Assets (6)
Log of total assets, LTA = log (Total Assets (6) ∗Adjustment to 2000 Dollars)
Book equity to market equity, BTM = Total Common Equity (60)Fiscal Year Close Price (199) * Common Shares Outstanding (54)
Intangible assets, INTANG = Intangibles (33)Total Book Assets (6)
Cash flow, CF = Operating Income Before Depreciation (13)Total Book Assets (6)
Dividend paying firms, DDIV =
{
1 if Common Dividends (21) > 0
0 if Common Dividends (21) = 0
S&P credit rating, CR =
S&P Historical Long-Term Debt Ratings (280) organized into 10 rating groups:
1=AAA, 2=AA, 3=A, 4=BBB, 5=BB, 6=B, 7=CCC, 8=CC, 9=C, 10=D
Firm Value =
Fiscal Year Close Price (199)*Common Shares Outstanding (54)
+ Debt in Current Liabilities (34) + Long-term Debt (9)
+ Liquidating Value of Preferred Stock (1) - Deferred Tax and Investment Tax Credit (35)
ZSCORE = 3.3*Pretax Income (170) + 1.0*Net Sales (12) + 1.4*Retained Earnings (36) + 1.2*Working Capital (179)Total Book Assets (6)
Financially unconstrained firms, UNFC =


1 if Long-term Debt Issuance (111)Total Assets (6) ≥ 66th percentile
or Long-term Debt Reductions (114)Total Assets (6) ≥ 66th percentile
or Equity Issuances (108)Total Assets (6) ≥ 66th percentile
or Equity Reduction (115)Total Assets (6) ≥ 66th percentile
0 otherwise
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Long-term debt issuance, DISS = Long-term Debt Issuance (111)Total Assets (6)
Long-term debt reduction, DRED = Long-term Debt Reductions (114)Total Assets (6)
Equity issuance, EISS = Equity Issuances (108)Total Assets (6)
Equity reduction, ERED = Equity Reduction (115)Total Assets (6)
Credit spread, CS = Moody’s Baa Rate−Moody’s Aaa Rate (Source : Economagic)
Personal tax penalty, PTP =
τp − (1− τ c)τ e
for τ c = observed marginal tax rate and τe = [d+ (1 − d)gα]τp
where d is the dividend payout ratio, g is 0.4 before 1987 and 1.0 after (although gτp is never greater
than 0.28), α is 0.25, and τp is 47.4% for 1980-1981, 40.7% for 1982-1986, 33.1% for 1987, 28.7% for
1988-1992, and 29.6% for 1993 and onwards.
46
Table I: Sample construction. y∗ is the “equilibrium” marginal benefit/cost level, x∗ is the observed
or “equilibrium” interest payments over book value (IOB), and C is the set of (cost) control variables.
C ≡ {COL,LTA,BTM, INTANG,CF,DDIV }. ZSCORE is a measure of financial distress. LTDEIR
stands for long-term debt or equity issuances or repurchases as described in the text. CL and WW are
financial constraint measures as defined by Cleary (1999) and Whited and Wu (2006) indices, respectively.
Sample No. Obs
All firm-year obs. with marginal benefit (MB) curves and Compustat data in 1980-2007 126,611
Non-M&A firm-years with positive book value, common equity, capital, and sales 112,239
Sample excluding finance and insurance, utilities, and public administration industries 91,687
Sample with non-missing (y∗i,t, x
∗
i,t, Ci,t) variables: Sample A 79,942
Sample of financially unconstrained and non-distressed firm-years: Sample B 12,883
LTDEIR above second tercile and ZSCORE above second tercile
For robustness checks:
Sample of financially unconstrained and non-distressed firm-years: Sample C 8.554
CL in bottom tercile and ZSCORE in top tercile
Sample of financially unconstrained and non-distressed firm-years: Sample D 10,316
WW in bottom tercile and ZSCORE in top tercile
Sample of financially unconstrained and non-distressed firm-years: Sample E 28,479
LTDEIR above median and ZSCORE above median
Sample of financially unconstrained and non-distressed firm-years: Sample F 6,623
LTDEIR in top quartile and ZSCORE in top quartile
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Table II: Summary statistics for all firms (Sample A) and unconstrained, non-distressed firms (Sample B).
IOB is the observed interest over book value (x∗), COL is collateralizable assets over total book values,
LTA is log of total assets expressed in 2000 dollars, BTM is book equity to market equity, INTANG is
intangible assets over total book values, CF is net cashflow over total book values, and DDIV is an indicator
for dividend paying firms. AREA is the area under the marginal benefit curve, used as the identifying
instrument in panel specification (i). CR is the credit rankings based on the S&P long-term domestic issuer
credit ratings, where 1=AAA, 2=AA, 3=A, 4=BBB, 5=BB, 6=B, 7=CCC, 8=CC, 9=C, 10=D. ZSCORE
is a measure of financial distress. UNFC is an indicator for financially unconstrained firms, defined as having
long-term debt and equity issuance and/or reduction in the top tercile. DISS, DRED, EISS, and ERED
are long-term debt issuance, long-term debt reduction, equity issuance, and equity reduction, respectively,
that are used to calculate UNFC. CL and WW are financial constraint measures as defined by the Cleary
(1999) and Whited and Wu (2006) indices, respectively.
Sample A: All Firms
No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Med Max
IOB 79942 0.032 0.024 0.000 0.026 0.136
COL 79942 0.497 0.230 0.000 0.516 1.000
LTA 79942 5.048 2.167 -3.518 4.904 12.989
BTM 79942 0.762 0.628 0.030 0.588 4.539
INTANG 79942 0.058 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.593
CF 79942 0.093 0.154 -0.985 0.119 0.395
DDIV 79942 0.389 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000
AREA 79125 0.033 0.027 0.000 0.028 0.139
CR 14100 4.183 1.304 1.000 4.000 10.000
ZSCORE 76302 1.644 2.102 -15.693 2.000 5.591
UNFC 79431 0.525 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000
DISS 79353 0.082 0.220 0.000 0.007 8.568
DRED 79448 0.079 0.221 0.000 0.020 8.396
EISS 79652 0.039 0.123 0.000 0.002 2.804
ERED 79698 0.011 0.045 0.000 0.000 5.690
CL 52104 0.182 1.269 -6.925 0.167 8.602
WW 72940 -0.243 0.120 -0.541 -0.239 0.078
Sample B: Financially Unconstrained and Non-distressed Firms
(LTDEIR in top tercile and ZSCORE in top tercile)
No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Med Max
IOB 12883 0.029 0.023 0.000 0.024 0.135
COL 12883 0.493 0.203 0.000 0.512 0.976
LTA 12883 5.283 1.819 0.211 5.156 12.211
BTM 12883 0.633 0.509 0.030 0.493 4.443
INTANG 12883 0.053 0.088 0.000 0.007 0.591
CF 12883 0.179 0.082 -0.441 0.177 0.395
DDIV 12883 0.494 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
AREA 12704 0.045 0.028 0.000 0.041 0.139
CR 2124 3.718 1.252 1.000 4.000 10.000
ZSCORE 12883 3.169 0.659 2.372 2.997 5.586
UNFC 12883 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
DISS 12833 0.131 0.358 0.000 0.017 8.568
DRED 12846 0.134 0.363 0.000 0.040 8.396
EISS 12871 0.035 0.079 0.000 0.006 0.994
ERED 12877 0.034 0.069 0.000 0.001 1.730
CL 9200 -0.114 1.067 -6.872 -0.057 7.218
WW 12061 -0.266 0.101 -0.541 -0.264 0.075
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Table III: Marginal cost of debt estimates using unconstrained, non-distressed firms (Sample B). We estimate
the coefficients in equation (1), where y∗i,t is the observed marginal benefit/cost level (recall that that in
equilibrium it holds that y∗i,t = MCi,t(x
∗
i,t) = MBi,t(x
∗
i,t)), x
∗
i,t is the observed interest expenses over book
value (IOB), z is the identifying instrument, and C is the set of cost control variables. We consider two main
specifications: (i) panel approach, z ≡ {AREA}, (ii) 1986 Tax Reform Act, z ≡ {TRA86}. Specifications
(iii) repeats (i) with firm fixed effects. Specification (iv) repeats specification (i) with year dummies. The
set of control variables is C ≡ {COL,LTA,BTM, INTANG,CF,DDIV }. COL is collateralizable assets
over total book values, LTA is log of total assets expressed in 2000 dollars, BTM is book equity to market
equity, INTANG is intangible assets over total book values, CF is net cashflow over total book values, and
DDIV is an indicator for dividend paying firms. All control variables, except DDIV , are standardized to
have mean zero and standard deviation one based on all firms (Sample A). DDIV is a binary variable with
values {0,1}. Robust, clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
by both firm and year as in Thompson (2009) and Petersen (2009). Significance at the 10% level is indicated
by *, 5% level by **, and 1% level by ***.
(1) y∗i,t = MCi,t = a+ bx
∗
i,t +
∑
c∈C
θcci,t + ξi,t
z ≡ {AREA} z ≡ {TRA86} z ≡ {AREA} z ≡ {AREA}
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Constant 0.112 *** -0.188 ** -0.128 *** 0.227 ***
(0.018) (0.089) (0.042) (0.014)
IOB 4.810 *** 13.188 *** 12.002 *** 3.139 ***
(0.534) (2.407) (1.199) (0.193)
COL -0.040 *** -0.112 *** -0.076 *** -0.028 ***
(0.005) (0.022) (0.015) (0.003)
LTA 0.016 *** 0.036 *** 0.110 *** 0.019 **
(0.003) (0.008) (0.016) (0.002)
BTM -0.018 *** -0.046 *** -0.040 *** -0.018 ***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002)
INTANG -0.025 *** -0.052 *** -0.032 *** -0.013 ***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.002)
CF 0.085 *** 0.120 *** 0.088 *** 0.075 ***
(0.007) (0.017) (0.010) (0.004)
DDIV 0.064 *** 0.106 *** 0.090 *** 0.042 ***
(0.008) (0.020) (0.013) (0.004)
No. Obs. 12704 12833 12704 12704
Firm Fixed Effects? N N Y N
Year Fixed Effects? N N N Y
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Table IV: Marginal cost of debt estimates using all firms (Sample A). We estimate the coefficients in equation
(1), where yi,t is the observed marginal benefit/cost level (recall that that in equilibrium it holds that
y∗i,t = MCi,t(x
∗
i,t) = MBi,t(x
∗
i,t)), x
∗
i,t is the observed interest expenses over book value (IOB), z is the
identifying instrument, and C is the set of cost control variables. We consider two main specifications: (i)
panel approach, z ≡ {AREA}, (ii) 1986 Tax Reform Act, z ≡ {TRA86}. Specifications (iii) repeats (i) with
firm fixed effects. Specification (iv) repeats specification (i) with year dummies. The set of control variables
is C ≡ {COL,LTA,BTM, INTANG,CF,DDIV }. COL is collateralizable assets over total book values,
LTA is log of total assets expressed in 2000 dollars, BTM is book equity to market equity, INTANG
is intangible assets over total book values, CF is net cashflow over total book values, and DDIV is an
indicator for dividend paying firms. All control variables, except DDIV , are standardized to have mean zero
and standard deviation one based on all firms (Sample A). DDIV is a binary variable with values {0,1}.
Robust, clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by both firm
and year as in Thompson (2009) and Petersen (2009). Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, 5%
level by **, and 1% level by ***.
(1) y∗i,t =MCi,t = a + bx
∗
i,t +
∑
c∈C
θcci,t + ξi,t
z ≡ {AREA} z ≡ {TRA86} z ≡ {AREA} z ≡ {AREA}
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Constant -0.029 * -0.133 ** -0.355 *** -0.025 ***
(0.016) (0.056) (0.054) (0.008)
IOB 7.915 *** 10.856 *** 17.984*** 7.829 ***
(0.423) (1.492) (1.614) (0.229)
COL -0.070 *** -0.092 *** -0.126 *** -0.068 ***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.003)
LTA 0.015 *** 0.017 *** 0.069 *** 0.013 ***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.002)
BTM -0.018 *** -0.022 *** -0.025 *** -0.015 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
INTANG -0.037 *** -0.046 *** -0.040 *** -0.039 ***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002)
CF 0.080 *** 0.083 *** 0.103 *** 0.081 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002)
DDIV 0.133 *** 0.156 *** 0.160 *** 0.134 ***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.005)
No. Obs. 79125 79942 79125 79125
Fixed Effects? N N Y N
Year Fixed Effects? N N N Y
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Table V: The influence of each of the control variables on the cost of debt (as estimated in Tables III and
IV) is shown in the left column, in comparison to the influence of the variable on the corporate debt ratios
in the right column (as documented in the capital structure literature). COL is asset collateralizability,
LTA is firm size in terms of book assets, BTM is the book to market ratio, INTANG is asset intangibility,
CF is cashflow, and DDIV is an indicator for dividend paying firms. Generally speaking, our estimated
coefficients are consistent with those in the capital structure literature, given that the coefficient signs are
opposite between the two approaches.
Dependent Variable
Control Variable Cost of Debt Leverage
COL – +
LTA + +/-
BTM – +
INTANG – +
CF + –
DDIV + –
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Table VI: Marginal benefit and marginal cost functions of debt for the average (representative) firm in
all firms (Sample A) and unconstrained, non-distressed firms (Sample B). The marginal benefit curve is
calculated by taking the average of the marginal tax rates (MB) and interest expenses over book assets
(IOB) at 0%, 20%, 40%, ..., 1000% of observed IOB. That is, 100% of observed is the actual level of IOB
in a given firm-year. The marginal cost curve is calculated using equation (12), which estimates equation (1)
on Sample B (column (i) in Table III), and the sample means of the standardized values of the cost control
variables.
Sample A Sample B
All Firms Unconstrained, Non-distressed Firms
Interest Over Marginal Marginal Interest Over Marginal Marginal
Book Value Benefit Cost Book Value Benefit Cost
(IOB) (MB) (MC) (IOB) (MB) (MC)
0% of Observed 0.0000 0.3033 0.1123 0.0000 0.3547 0.1738
20% of Obs. 0.0063 0.2978 0.1427 0.0060 0.3519 0.2025
40% of Obs. 0.0127 0.2920 0.1732 0.0119 0.3491 0.2312
60% of Obs. 0.0190 0.2858 0.2036 0.0179 0.3459 0.2599
80% of Obs. 0.0253 0.2791 0.2341 0.0239 0.3421 0.2886
Observed IOB 0.0317 0.2715 0.2646 0.0299 0.3377 0.3174
120% of Obs. 0.0380 0.2629 0.2950 0.0358 0.3318 0.3461
160% of Obs. 0.0507 0.2459 0.3559 0.0478 0.3200 0.4035
200% of Obs. 0.0633 0.2282 0.4168 0.0597 0.3049 0.4609
300% of Obs. 0.0950 0.1893 0.5691 0.0896 0.2649 0.6045
400% of Obs. 0.1266 0.1564 0.7213 0.1194 0.2269 0.7481
500% of Obs. 0.1583 0.1308 0.8736 0.1493 0.1945 0.8916
600% of Obs. 0.1900 0.1117 1.0259 0.1791 0.1687 1.0352
700% of Obs. 0.2216 0.0970 1.1781 0.2090 0.1480 1.1788
800% of Obs. 0.2533 0.0858 1.3304 0.2388 0.1307 1.3224
900% of Obs. 0.2849 0.0768 1.4827 0.2687 0.1167 1.4659
1000% of Obs. 0.3166 0.0697 1.6349 0.2985 0.1056 1.6095
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Table VII: Key financial characteristics for Hasbro, Inc. and Black & Decker. TA is total assets expressed
in thousands of 2000 dollars, D/E is the debt to equity ratio, COL is collateralizable assets over total book
assets, BTM is the book equity to market equity ratio, INTANG is intangible assets over total book assets,
CF is net cashflow over total book value, and DIV S is total dividend payout over total book assets. For
each variable, both decile rankings within the sample and actual values for each firm and year are provided.
Hasbro, Inc.
1990 1999 2007
Decile Value Decile Value Decile Value
TA 9 1693.5 10 4614.0 9 2688.5
D/E 3 0.0443 5 0.0942 8 0.2192
COL 2 0.2386 2 0.1630 2 0.1381
BTM 7 0.9563 5 0.5090 4 0.3470
INTANG 10 0.1835 10 0.3934 9 0.2958
CF 8 0.1736 7 0.1586 9 0.2120
DIVS 8 0.0089 9 0.0105 10 0.0303
Black & Decker
1990 1999 2007
Decile Value Decile Value Decile Value
TA 10 7763.1 9 4148.2 9 4493.9
D/E 10 0.4679 7 0.2111 7 0.2179
COL 2 0.2838 4 0.3715 5 0.3219
BTM 9 1.6073 2 0.1762 4 0.3257
INTANG 3 0.0000 5 0.0000 9 0.2751
CF 6 0.1183 8 0.1735 7 0.1471
DIVS 7 0.0041 9 0.0104 9 0.0201
53
Table VIII: Summary statistics for benefits and costs of debt. Cost measures are based on equation (12), which itself is based on Sample B coefficient
estimates from column (i) in Table III. The observed (equilibrium) gross benefits of debt, GBDo (GBDe), is the area under the marginal benefit
curve up to the observed (equilibrium) level of interest over book value (IOB). The observed (equilibrium) cost of debt, CDo (CDe), is the area
under the marginal cost curve up to the observed (equilibrium) level of IOB. The observed (equilibrium) net benefits of debt, NBDo (NBDe), is the
area under the marginal benefit curve minus the area under the marginal cost curve up to the observed (equilibrium) IOB. Observed is defined as the
actual IOB that the firm employs. Equilibrium is defined as the intersection of the marginal benefit and cost curves. The cost of being overlevered,
DWo, is the deadweight loss from additional costs due to observed IOB being greater than the equilibrium. The cost of being underlevered, DWu,
is the deadweight loss from lower benefits due to observed IOB being below the equilibrium.
Panel A: All Firms (Sample A)
No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 1% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 99%
Observed gross benefits of debt (GBDo) 78398 0.0900 0.0796 0.0000 0.0056 0.0274 0.0729 0.1308 0.1964 0.3485
Observed costs of debt (CDo) 78398 0.0791 0.0860 -0.0207 0.0052 0.0226 0.0567 0.1066 0.1776 0.4098
Observed net benefits of debt (NBDo) 78398 0.0109 0.0577 -0.2180 -0.0387 0.0000 0.0158 0.0375 0.0622 0.1154
Equilibrium gross benefits of debt (GBDe) 78398 0.1039 0.0781 0.0000 0.0000 0.0309 0.1034 0.1616 0.2076 0.2902
Equilibrium costs of debt (CDe) 78398 0.0688 0.0536 -0.0305 0.0000 0.0163 0.0733 0.1124 0.1371 0.1774
Equilibrium net benefits of debt (NBDe) 78398 0.0352 0.0333 0.0000 0.0000 0.0083 0.0278 0.0530 0.0798 0.1392
Panel B: Financially Distressed and/or Constrained Firms (in Sample A and not in Sample B)
No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 1% 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 99%
Cost of overlevering (DWo) 31881 0.0379 0.0635 0.0000 0.0003 0.0024 0.0130 0.0452 0.1057 0.3008
Cost of underlevering (DWu) 34045 0.0140 0.0181 0.0000 0.0002 0.0018 0.0076 0.0194 0.0359 0.0812
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Table IX: Among firms that operate within 5% of equilibrium, the hypothetical benefits and costs of debt if they were to operate out of equilibrium.
Cost measures are based on equation (12), which estimates equation (1) on Sample B (column (i) in Table III). The gross tax benefits of debt, GBD,
is the area under the marginal benefits curve up to the indicated level of interest over book value (IOB). The cost of debt, CD is the area under the
marginal cost curve up to the indicated level of IOB. The net benefits of debt, NBD, is the area under the marginal benefits curve minus the area
under the marginal cost curve up to the indicated IOB. Equilibrium is defined as the intersection of the marginal benefit and cost curves. The cost
of being overlevered, DWo, is the deadweight loss from additional costs due to having IOB above the equilibrium. The cost of being underlevered,
DWu, is the deadweight loss from lower benefits due to having IOB below the equilibrium.
Panel A: All Firms (Sample A)
N GBD CD NBD DWo DWu
0% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0447
20% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.0272 0.0116 0.0156 0.0291
40% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.0543 0.0264 0.0279 0.0168
60% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.0812 0.0443 0.0369 0.0078
80% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.1079 0.0654 0.0425 0.0021
at equilibrium IOB 3497 0.1342 0.0896 0.0446
120% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.1588 0.1169 0.0419 0.0028
160% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.2026 0.1811 0.0215 0.0232
200% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.2405 0.2579 -0.0174 0.0621
300% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.3117 0.5050 -0.1933 0.2379
400% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.3575 0.8309 -0.4734 0.5181
500% of equilibrium IOB 3497 0.3878 1.2355 -0.8477 0.8924
Panel B: Investment Grade Firms
N GBD CD NBD DWo DWu
0% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0258
20% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.0237 0.0146 0.0091 0.0167
40% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.0473 0.0311 0.0162 0.0096
60% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.0709 0.0496 0.0213 0.0044
80% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.0945 0.0700 0.0245 0.0012
at equilibrium IOB 547 0.1180 0.0923 0.0257
120% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.1407 0.1166 0.0241 0.0016
160% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.1830 0.1709 0.0121 0.0136
200% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.2222 0.2331 -0.0109 0.0366
300% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.3037 0.4222 -0.1186 0.1443
400% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.3630 0.6599 -0.2969 0.3226
500% of equilibrium IOB 547 0.4045 0.9459 -0.5414 0.5671
Panel C: Speculative Firms
N GBD CD NBD DWo DWu
0% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0592
20% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.0356 0.0148 0.0208 0.0384
40% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.0710 0.0339 0.0371 0.0221
60% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.1062 0.0572 0.0489 0.0102
80% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.1411 0.0848 0.0563 0.0029
at equilibrium IOB 323 0.1757 0.1167 0.0591
120% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.2079 0.1528 0.0552 0.0040
160% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.2633 0.2377 0.0256 0.0336
200% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.3079 0.3397 -0.0318 0.0910
300% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.3794 0.6692 -0.2898 0.3490
400% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.4173 1.1052 -0.6878 0.7470
500% of equilibrium IOB 323 0.4398 1.6475 -1.2077 1.2669
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Table X: Alternative control variables. We estimate the coefficients in equation (1), where yi,t is the observed
marginal benefit/cost level (recall that that in equilibrium it holds that y∗i,t = MCi,t(x
∗
i,t) = MBi,t(x
∗
i,t)),
x∗i,t is the observed interest expenses over book value (IOB), z is the identifying instrument, and C is
the set of cost control variables. We consider the panel approach for which z ≡ {AREA}. The set of
control variables is C ≡ {COL,LTA,BTM, INTANG,CF,DDIV }, and one of each alternative control
specification: {CS, PTP}. COL is collateralizable assets over total book values, LTA is log of total assets
expressed in 2000 dollars, BTM is book equity to market equity, INTANG is intangible assets over total
book values, CF is net cashflow over total book values, and DDIV is an indicator for dividend paying
firms. CS is the spread between Moody’s Baa rate and Aaa rate, and PTP is the personal tax penalty as
measured in Graham (1999). All control variables, except DDIV , are standardized to have mean zero and
standard deviation one based on all firms (Sample A). DDIV is a binary variable with values {0,1}. Robust,
clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year
as in Thompson (2009) and Petersen (2009). Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, 5% level by **,
and 1% level by ***.
(1) y∗i,t = MCi,t = a+ bx
∗
i,t +
∑
c∈C
θcci,t + ξi,t
Credit Spread Personal Tax Penalty
(CS) (PTP)
Constant 0.153 *** 0.167 ***
(0.017) (0.012)
IOB 3.770 *** 3.197 ***
(0.405) (0.295)
COL -0.033 *** -0.028 ***
(0.004) (0.003)
LTA 0.018 *** 0.022 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
BTM -0.020 *** -0.019 ***
(0.004) (0.003)
INTANG -0.019 *** -0.012 ***
(0.003) (0.003)
CF 0.078 *** 0.066 ***
(0.006) (0.005)
DDIV 0.050 *** 0.066 ***
(0.006) (0.005)
CS 0.026 ***
(0.004)
PTP 0.037 ***
(0.005)
No. Obs. 12704 11907
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Table XI: Marginal cost of debt estimated on unconstrained, non-distressed firms (Sample B) using
panel specification (i) for 1980-1986, 1989-1997, 1998-2007, and 1980-2007 with year dummies. We
estimate the coefficients in equation (1), where yi,t is the observed marginal benefit/cost level (recall
that that in equilibrium it holds that y∗i,t = MCi,t(x
∗
i,t) = MBi,t(x
∗
i,t)), x
∗
i,t is the observed interest
expenses over book value (IOB), z is the identifying instrument, and C is the set of cost control
variables. We consider specification (i) where z ≡ {AREA}. The set of control variables is C ≡
{COL,LTA,BTM, INTANG,CF,DDIV }. COL is collateralizable assets over total book values, LTA is
log of total assets expressed in 2000 dollars, BTM is book equity to market equity, INTANG is intangible
assets over total book values, CF is net cashflow over total book values, and DDIV is an indicator for
dividend paying firms. All control variables, except DDIV , are standardized to have mean zero and standard
deviation one based on all firms (Sample A). DDIV is a binary variable with values {0,1}. Robust, clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year as in
Thompson (2009) and Petersen (2009). Significance at the 10% level is indicated by *, 5% level by **, and
1% level by ***.
(1) y∗i,t = MCi,t = a+ bx
∗
i,t +
∑
c∈C
θcci,t + ξi,t
1980-1986 1989-1997 1998-2007 1980-2007
Constant 0.177 *** 0.187 *** 0.178 *** 0.227 ***
(0.029) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
IOB 4.275 *** 2.336 *** 2.605 *** 3.139 ***
(0.509) (0.210) (0.308) (0.193)
COL -0.042 *** -0.022 *** -0.023 *** -0.028 ***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
LTA 0.025 *** 0.020 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 ***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
BTM -0.026 *** -0.017 *** -0.009 -0.018 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002)
INTANG -0.029 *** -0.009 *** -0.007 *** -0.013 ***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
CF 0.117 *** 0.062 *** 0.061 *** 0.075 ***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
DDIV 0.050 *** 0.034 *** 0.044 *** 0.042 ***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
No. Obs. 3058 8694 4075 12704
Year fixed effects? N N N Y
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Table XII: Analysis of alternative definitions of being financially unconstrained (C) Cleary (1999) index
in bottom tercile, (D) Whited and Wu (2006) index in bottom tercile, (E) long term debt and equity
issuance and/or reduction (LTDEIR) above median and a measure of Altman’s ZSCORE above median,
(F) LTDEIR in top quartile and ZSCORE in top quartile. We estimate the coefficients in equation
(1), where yi,t is the observed marginal benefit/cost level (recall that that in equilibrium it holds that
y∗i,t = MCi,t(x
∗
i,t) = MBi,t(x
∗
i,t)), x
∗
i,t is the observed interest expenses over book value (IOB), z is the
identifying instrument, and C is the set of cost control variables. We consider the panel approach for which
z ≡ {AREA}. The set of control variables is C ≡ {COL,LTA,BTM, INTANG,CF,DDIV }. COL is
collateralizable assets over total book values, LTA is log of total assets expressed in 2000 dollars, BTM is
book equity to market equity, INTANG is intangible assets over total book values, CF is net cashflow over
total book values, and DDIV is an indicator for dividend paying firms. All control variables, except DDIV ,
are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one based on all firms (Sample A). DDIV is a
binary variable with values {0,1}. Robust, clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered by both firm and year as in Thompson (2009) and Petersen (2009). Significance at the
10% level is indicated by *, 5% level by **, and 1% level by ***.
(1) y∗i,t =MCi,t = a+ bx
∗
i,t +
∑
c∈C
θcci,t + ξi,t
Sample C Sample D Sample E Sample F
Constant 0.192 *** 0.175 *** 0.086 *** 0.117 ***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021)
IOB 3.491 *** 4.175 *** 5.578 *** 4.493 ***
(0.488) (0.466) (0.504) (0.586)
COL -0.021 *** -0.032 *** -0.048 *** -0.037 ***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
LTA 0.014 *** 0.007 * 0.018 *** 0.015 ***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
BTM -0.002 0.004 -0.021 *** -0.014 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
INTANG -0.016 *** -0.021 *** -0.026 *** -0.022 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
CF 0.068 *** 0.066 *** 0.092 *** 0.085 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
DDIV 0.050 *** 0.054 *** 0.070 *** 0.061 ***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
No. Obs. 8495 10241 28169 6518
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Figure 1: Capital structure equilibrium for a financially unconstrained, non-distressed firm. The figure shows
the marginal benefit curve of debt, MB(x), the marginal cost curve of debt, MC(x), and the equilibrium
amount of interest deductions over book value, x∗, where marginal cost and marginal benefit are equated.
The equilibrium marginal benefit (which equals the equilibrium marginal cost) is denoted by y∗. Also, note
that the benefit function becomes downward sloping at the point we refer to as the “kink.”
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Figure 2: Identifying the cost function using shifts in the marginal benefit function. The figure shows four
marginal benefit curves of debt, each intersected by the marginal cost curve of debt. The four marginal
benefit curves can represent the same firm at four different points in time. The marginal benefit curves
can alternatively represent four different firms at the same point in time. Empirically, we use both cross-
sectional and time-series variation in marginal benefit curves to identify the marginal cost function of debt.
Notice that the area under the marginal benefit curve, AREA, is a good proxy for the location of the curve:
MB1(x) ≥MB2(x) ≥MB3(x) ≥MB4(x) implies that AREA1 ≥ AREA2 ≥ AREA3 ≥ AREA4.
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Figure 3: Comparing marginal cost curves for firms with high and low asset collateral (COL). The figure
shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase (decrease) in COL when all other firm characteristics
remain at the average. Firms with high collateral face a lower cost of debt.
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Figure 4: The average (representative) firms in Samples A and B. The marginal benefit curves are based on
the average marginal tax benefit and interest over book values for each sample. The marginal cost curves
are obtained using equation (12) and sample means of the standardized cost control variables.
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Figure 5: Marginal benefit and marginal cost curves for Hasbro, Inc. The vertical line reflects actual debt
usage.
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Black & Decker, 2007
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Figure 6: Marginal benefit and marginal cost curves for Black & Decker. The vertical line reflects actual
debt usage.
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Figure 7: The figures show the marginal benefit curve of debt, MB(x), the marginal cost curve of debt,
MC(x), and the equilibrium level of debt, x∗, that occurs where marginal cost and marginal benefit are
equated. The marginal benefit level at x∗ (which equals the marginal cost level at x∗) is denoted by y∗.
Panel A depicts the equilibrium gross benefit of debt, the shaded area under the MB curve up to x∗. Panel
B depicts the equilibrium cost of debt, the shaded area under the MC curve up to x∗. Panel C depicts the
equilibrium net benefit of debt, the shaded area between the MB and MC curves up to x∗. Panel D depicts
the cost of being overlevered, the shaded area between the MC and MB curves from the equilibrium, x∗,
to the observed debt, xo, in the case where the actual level of debt, xo, exceeds the equilibrium level of debt
x∗.
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Figure 8: a) Histogram based on equilibrium gross benefit of debt percentiles with paired equilibrium cost
of debt observations, b) equilibrium gross and net benefit of debt from 1980 to 2007 for all firms and high
equilibrium net benefit firms (firms with equilibrium net benefit of debt above the 50th percentile).
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Figure 9: Hypothetical deadweight costs of being underlevered or overlevered for companies within 5% of
their equilibrium IOB among Sample A firms, investment grade firms, and junk rated firms.
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Figure 10: Hypothetical net benefit of debt (gross benefit of debt minus cost of debt) for firms within 5% of
their equilibrium IOB for Sample A firms and for firms with high equilibrium net benefit of debt (firms with
equilibrium net benefit above the 50th percentile). The curve shows that for the typical near-equilibrium
firm, optimal capital structure increases book value by an amount equal to 4.5% of book assets. For a firm
with high benefits of debt, optimal capital structure increases firm value by about 5.9% of book assets. The
capital structure value function is fairly flat for movements within ±20% of optimal, but falls off steeply for
larger deviations.
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Figure 11: Comparing Almeida and Phillippon (2007) risk-adjusted net present value distress costs as a
percentage of firm value against our ex ante measure of the cost of debt for AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, and B
rated firms. The Almeida and Phillippon (2007) distress costs, based on a default rate of 16.5%, are obtained
from Table IV of their paper. Our cost measures are calculated using equation (12). a) Cost of debt numbers
for the Almeida and Phillippon sample period of 1985 to 2004. The numbers imply that the cost of default
is about half of the total cost of debt, suggesting that the other half is due to non-default costs. b) Cost of
debt numbers for three periods in our sample period: 1980 to 1986, 1989 to 1996, and 1998 to 2007.
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